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Introduction
The events of 1989-1990 in Eastern Europe
put again a theme of the intellectuals (or intelli-
gentsia if to be more precise in the context of
tradition in this region) in the center of sociolo-
gical and political discourse. The active partici-
pation in the political scene and the evident de-
construction of this social group soon after the
collapse of communism gave the inspiration to
re-discuss their role and future prospects.
In this purpose there is activated need to
review the discourse in Western countries on
the issue of intellectuals and their position as
well as new roles in advanced societies. Such
need is based on the assumption that new re-
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Santrauka
Ðis straipsnis siekia apþvelgti vienà ið pagrindiniø Vakaruose plëtojamø diskursø, susijusiø su
intelektualais ir jø vaidmeniu ðiuolaikinëse iðsivysèiusiose visuomenëse, o taip pat apsvarstyti ðio
diskurso atgarsius posovietinëje sociologijoje. Ðio diskurso iðtakose - Bello ir Gouldnerio teorinës
áþvalgos apie naujosios klasës atsiradimà keièiantis visuomenës poreikiams ðiuolaikiniø aukðtøjø
technologijø kontekste. Bellas pabrëþia vis didëjanèià ðios klasës átakà ir galià, susijusià su mono-
polistiniu þiniø ir sugebëjimø valdymu bei vyraujanèiu ðios klasës vaidmeniu, kuriant, platinant ir
diegiant þinojimà. Tuo tarpu Goudneris, visiðkai pritardamas tokios klasës spartaus formavimosi
koncepcijai, gerokai prapleèia diskursà teigdamas, kad ðioji klasë nëra apolitiðka, be to, ji turi
dvejopà prigimtá: viena vertus, ji yra inovacijø ðaltinis, taèiau, kita vertus, ji turi elitistiniø kultûrinës
burþuazijos bruoþø gindama savo materialinius bei galios siekimo interesus.
Naujosios klasës teorija apie vis didëjanèià intelektualø bei techninës inteligentijos galià bei vaid-
mená sulaukë plataus atgarsio tarp Vakarø mokslininkø. Vieni plëtojo ir gilino ðias teorines áþval-
gas, ypaè pabrëþdami vis stiprëjanèià elitistinæ naujosios klasës laikysenà, jos kosmopolitizmà,
narcisizmà ir savi-izoliacijà nuo likusios visuomenës dalies (Lasch, Freedman, Pels). Kiti (Jakoby,
Eva-Etzioni) atskleidþia naujus neigiamus ðios klasës bruoþus: konformizmà, priklausomybæ nuo
pajamø ðaltiniø, atitrûkimà nuo visuomeninës veiklos. Taèiau nemaþa dalis tyrëjø (pvz., Flack,
Goldfarb ir kiti) randa ir teigiamø tendencijø: pvz., didëjanèià átakà naujiems socialiniams judëji-
mams, pilietinei visuomenei bei demokratijos stiprinimui.
Naujosios klasës diskursas rado stiprø atgarsá ir tarp posovietiniø ðaliø sociologø, tirianèiø inte-
ligentijos ir intelektualø vaidmená ðiame regione. Daugelis jø ávairiai panaudoja ir praturtina ðá
diskursà: ieðko panaðumø, kritikuoja ar kelia hipotezes apie posovietiniø intelektualø ateitá, turëda-
mi mintyse, kad visuomenës raida gali priartëti prie iðsivysèiusiø demokratiniø ðaliø situacijos.
Nors vyrauja pesimistinës ðios grupës nykimo ir vaidmens maþëjimo prognozës, naujosios klasës
diskurso teorinës áþvalgos suteikia galimybes giliau paþvelgti á intelektualø prisitaikymo prie naujøjø
sàlygø procesà ir jø savi-realizacijà kuriant pilietinæ visuomenæ.
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structurisation of post-communist societies ac-
cording to requirements of advanced capitalist
order will inevitably lead the position of high
educated people towards the similar one of their
colleges in Western countries.
The main and most powerful Western theo-
ries on intellectuals after the Second World War
can be found among the New Class theories
that reflect the rise of number of high educa-
ted people in conditions of great demand of all
kind of professionals in era of new technolo-
gies and knowledge. These theories can be best
represented by classical works of Daniel Bell
and Alvin Gouldner. These theories is chosen
not only because they inspired the numerous
attempts to verify and criticize proposed as-
sumptions, but also because of their exclusio-
nary influence on the debates about the role of
post-communist intellectuals.
Therefore, in this paper will be presented
the main arguments of these New Class theo-
ries as well as some relevant critics and further
elaboration of issue that appeared in later dis-
course on Western intellectuals mainly by the-
oretical assumptions in Jacoby and Lash works.
And the last part of paper will be devoted to
the fruitful use of this approach in works of
well known researches of post-communist
transformation such as I. Szelenyi and G. Kon-
rad in Hungary, M. Kempny, J. Kurczewska
and E.Mokrzycki in Poland, I.Bernik in Slove-
nia and L. Donskis in Lithuania, L. Greenfeld
and L. Gudkov in Russia.
Before the start of looking at these theories
it must be pointed out that the aim of this pa-
per is not to enter the jungles of hundreds of
definitions concerning differences between in-
tellectuals and intelligentsia. Besides these de-
finitions are also part of discourse, thus still
there is no agreement about their content. Ho-
wever, the theories of New Class tend to unify
these two concepts under the umbrella of the
group of highly educated people that is more
near to the specific meaning of intelligentsia in
Eastern Europe where intelligentsia refers to
the social group which “not only consisted of
men and women of a wide range of occupa-
tions and various intellectual and educational
levels, who shared certain beliefs, attitudes and
manners, but it formed a broad segment of so-
ciety with a relatively homogeneous spiritual
culture” (Gella, 1976, 20).
The discourse on the intellectuals in
Western theoretical tradition
Daniel Bell in his book “The Coming of Post-
industrial Society” proclaimed the birth and rise
of new kind of society in Western countries af-
ter the Second World War. This society, ac-
cording to him, first of all is characterized by
the two fundamental resources - technology
and knowledge. Since “knowledge and techno-
logy are embodied in social institutions and rep-
resented by persons, [] we can talk of a know-
ledge society” (Bell, 1973, 212).
The heart of such post-industrial society is
a class, which main capital is not a property as
in previous stage of capitalism, but its skill at-
tained by the higher education. This class is
primarily a professional class and, according
to Bell’s definition, is made up of four estates:
the scientific, the technological (applied skills:
engineering, economics, medicine), the admi-
nistrative, and the cultural (artistic and reli-
gious) (ibid., 375).
By talking about knowledge class Bell actu-
ally has in mind mainly this part of highly edu-
cated people, which “is committed to a func-
tional rationality and technocratic modes of
operation” in opposition to “the literary intel-
lectuals, who have become increasingly apoca-
lyptic, hedonistic, and nihilistic (Bell, 1973,
214). Such Bell’s position clearly echoes the
opinion of Schumpeter about intellectuals as
men who “wield weapons of spoken and writ-
ten words” but have no “practical responsibili-
ty” (Schumpeter, 1998, 163) and who mainly
are unable to perform useful for society work
and, consequently, are unsatisfied with their po-
sition in the society and, for this reason, they
are angry and full of destructive social critics
(ibid., 171-172).
From the other side, Bell’s argument is si-
milar to Faucault’s famous declaration on di-
sappearance of “universal intellectuals” in dis-
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pense of rise of “specific” ones. The reasons
of this diminished role of intellectuals, accor-
ding to Foucault, is rooted in evidence that the
function of enlightenment, representation and
formulation of the truth gradually loses its sig-
nificance in accordance to the increase of ge-
neral educational level and, as Faucault mani-
fests, will finally disappeared, because there is
no need to teach and articulate general truth
when almost everybody can do this by himself
or herself (Smart, 1985, 67).
The rise of the knowledge society, according
to Bell, was caused of crucial improvement in
technologies, so that manual and unskilled wor-
ker class is shrinking in the society, while at the
other end of the continuum the class of know-
ledge workers is becoming predominant (Bell,
1973, 343). Due to tremendous demand of spe-
cialists who would be able to operate with new
technologies and to create even more advanced
ones, in second half of XX century there is evi-
dent a considerable enlargement in the number
of people with the higher education in all bran-
ches of science. Thus, the expansion of science-
based industries requires more engineers, che-
mists, and mathematicians, on the other hand,
the need for social planning - in education, me-
dicine, and urban affairs - requires large num-
bers of persons trained in the social and biolo-
gical sciences (ibid., 232).
Due to the spread of educational and intel-
lectual institutions as a prime concern of the
knowledge society; not only the knowledge be-
comes embodied in class of professionals, but,
as Bell claims, eventually “the entire complex
of prestige and status will be rooted in the in-
tellectual and scientific communities” (Bell,
1973, 344). However, the core, the elite, “the
chief resource of the post-industrial society is
its scientific personnel” (ibid., 221). For him,
scientific personnel is defined as “persons en-
gaging in any scientific work requiring know-
ledge or training equivalent to at least four years
of college and specializing in one of the scien-
tific disciplines” (ibid., 222).
The considerable change in comparison with
previous order can be noticed also in the diffe-
rent location of new educated elite: “less than
one-fourth are employed in business and more
than half are in the universities” (Bell, 1973,
232). Thus, following Bell’s logic, just as the
business firm was the key institution of the past
hundred years because of its role in organizing
production for the mass creation of products,
the university - or some other form of a know-
ledge institute - will become the central insti-
tution of the next hundred years because of its
role as the new source of innovation and know-
ledge (ibid., 344). If to have in mind that the
necessary foundation for any new class is to
have an independent institutional base outside
the old dominant order, then, according to Bell,
for the scientists this base has been the univer-
sity (ibid., 232).
However, Bell does not claim that these edu-
cational institutions is entirely autonomous, rat-
her opposite is true that such institutions ex-
traordinary depend on the polity mainly becau-
se of three factors. First, education has been
traditionally a public function, in which the sta-
tes have had primary responsibility for elemen-
tary and secondary education. Second, the ba-
lance between private and public higher edu-
cation has shifted so that today the larger num-
ber of students are in publicly supported insti-
tutions of higher learning. And third, the inc-
reasing dependence of the entire educational
system on federal financing, particularly in hig-
her education. (Bell, 1973, 243).
Here naturally the question about new rela-
tionship of power in post-industrial society ari-
ses. Usually, when there is a change in the na-
ture of the system, new groups come to power.
Bell, by proclaiming that in new society tech-
nical skill becomes the base of and education
the mode of access to power; evidently faces
difficulties in explaining the new power rela-
tions. From the one side, as a stratum, scien-
tists, or more widely the technical intelligent-
sia, now have to be taken into account in the
political process (Bell, 1973, 359). The main
reason of this is rooted in fact that the mem-
bers of this new technocratic elite, with their
new techniques of decision making (systems
analysis, linear programming, and program bud-
geting), have now become essential to the for-
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mulation and analysis of decisions on which po-
litical judgments have to be made (ibid., 362).
But from the other side, these technologists
are not bound by a sufficient common interest
to make them a political class (Bell, 1973, 362).
Moreover, such technical intelligentsia holds a
double position: due to its interests in research
and positions in the universities, the intelligent-
sia becomes a claimant, like other groups, for
public support. At the same time, the techni-
cians represent an indispensable administrati-
ve staff for the political office holder with his
public following (ibid., 364). Therefore, the
control system of society is lodged not in a suc-
cessor-occupational class but in the political
order, and the question of who manages the
political order is an open one (ibid., 374).
In order to find the possible answer to this
question, Bell argues that in American society
there are three modes of power and social mo-
bility. There is the historical mode of property
as the basis of wealth and power, with inheri-
tance as the major route of access. There is
technical skill as the basis of power and posi-
tion, with education as the necessary route of
access to skill. And finally there is political of-
fice as a base of power, with organization of a
machine as the route of access. The difficulty
in the analysis of power in modern Western so-
cieties thus is that these three systems co-ex-
ist, overlap, and interpenetrate (Bell, 1973,
361).
What then is the basis for Bell to call new
emerged numerous group of professionals as a
class? According to this sociologist, they, des-
pite of the lack of common political interests,
do have common characteristics. They are,
first, the products of a new system in the rec-
ruitment for power. The norms of the new in-
telligentsia - the norms of professionalism - are
a departure from the hitherto prevailing norms
of economic self-interest, which have guided a
business civilization. In the upper reaches of
this new elite - that is, in the scientific commu-
nity - men hold significantly different values,
which could become the foundation of the new
ethos for such a class (Bell, 1973, 362).
However, it seems that Bell ascribes for this
knowledge class only the role to accumulate
and disseminate knowledge in society. He cle-
arly ignores the other side of these intellectu-
als, namely their ability to take active political
stance and to mobilize at least part of themsel-
ves for achieving political goals. Such dual cha-
racter of intellectuals can be definitely more
explored by the theory of other highly influen-
tial author - A. Gouldner.
Alvin Gouldner offers the most comprehen-
sive in this perspective knowledge class theory.
In his book “The Future of Intellectuals and the
Rise of the New Class” he analyses the emer-
gence of a New Class by reflecting the same ten-
dencies as Bell does. However, for him such New
Class is not neural in its interests: in essence it
is highly elitist at least in defining itself as res-
ponsible for and “representative” of society as
a whole (Gouldner, 1979, 3). Besides, accor-
ding to Gouldner, the New Class is evidently
self-seeking and uses its special knowledge to
advance its own interests and power, and to con-
trol its own work situation (ibid., 7).
Gouldner’s New Class differs from Bell’s
knowledge class also by including of intellec-
tuals in the composition. Differences between
the intellectuals and the intelligentsia can be
described best of all by different interests. In-
telligentsia’s intellectual interests are funda-
mentally “technical” and rests upon implemen-
tation of ideas into practice, while intellectuals
interests are primarily critical, emancipatory,
hermeneutic and hence often political (Gould-
ner, 1979, 48). Nevertheless, both these frac-
tions of the New Class are highly united as be-
ing the most “progressive force in modern so-
ciety and a center of whatever human emanci-
pation is possible in the future” (ibid., 83).
The arguments of this thesis lie on the sta-
tement that the New Class possesses the scien-
tific knowledge and the technical skills on which
the future of modern forces of production de-
pend. Besides, it is committed to the culture of
critical discourse, therefore resists old class and
also it is a center of opposition to almost all
forms of censorship. The New Class is also the
most internationalist and most universalist of
all social strata, it is the most cosmopolitant of
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all elites, etc., thus its control over ordinary
“foreign” languages, enables it to communica-
te with other nationalities.
However, this New Class has some contra-
dictions: it can be considered both as the cul-
tural bourgeoisie and as the speech communi-
ty. As new cultural bourgeoisie whose capital
is not its money but its control over valuable
cultures as cultural capital (Gouldner, 1979,
21). As such, it produced the new ideology that
“holds that productivity depends primarily on
science and technology”. Thus the use of scien-
ce and technology as a legitimating ideology
serves the New Class, lauding the functions it
performs, the skills it possesses, the educatio-
nal credentials it owns, and thereby strengthens
the New Class’s claims on incomes within the
status quo in which it finds itself (ibid., 25).
As a Speech Community the New Class is
characterized by the culture of careful and cri-
tical discourse. This is the key concept of
Gouldner’s theory and it constitutes “the com-
mon feature and quality of knowledge shared
by Marxist radicals, professionals, the techni-
cal intelligentsia, and adversary or counter-cul-
tural intellectuals” (Szelenyi, 1994, 726). The
culture of critical discourse is characterized by
speech that is relatively more situation free, it
is also relatively more reflexive, self-monito-
ring, capable of more meta-communication. Be-
sides, it requires that validity of claims be jus-
tified without reference to the speaker’s socie-
tal position or authority (Gouldner, 1979, 28).
The culture of critical discourse (CCD) can
also be the source of political activity of the New
Class and performs the uniting role. For exam-
ple, the New Class was widely united during the
anti-fascist movement of the 1930s and in their
opposition to the United States’ war on Viet-
nam (Gouldner, 1979, 30). CCD is radicalizing
partly because it experiences itself as distant
from conventional culture. According to Gould-
ner, “the deepest structure in the culture and
ideology of intellectuals is their pride in their
autonomy” (ibid., 33), and such autonomy is “an
expression of the social interests of the New
Class as a distinct group” (ibid., 34).
However, CCD is also the reason of ‘alie-
nation’ of New Class from the rest of society.
It is conducive to cosmopolitanism, that dis-
tances persons from local cultures, so that they
feel an alienation from the particularistic, his-
tory bound places and from ordinary, every-
day life (Gouldner, 1979, 59). Moreover, be-
cause of CCD (which is trained in educational
system) together with the cosmopolitanism of
the New Class all authoritative claims are now
potentially open to challenge. It claims “the
right to sit in judgement over the actions and
claims of any social class and all power elites”.
Traditional authority is striped of its ability to
define social reality and, with this, to authori-
ze its own legitimacy. Thus CCD is also the
mean of New Class to legitimate itself and also
inspiration to political act (ibid., 59).
The political strategies of New Class in pur-
suing its interests can be described by two ty-
pes: revolutionary strategy and strategy of re-
forms. First one is characterized by the culti-
vation of “an alliance with a mass working class,
proletariat or peasantry, to sharpen the con-
flict between that mass and the old moneyed
class” (Gouldner, 1979, 17). And second can
be divided into a ‘welfare’ state strategy and a
‘socialist’ state strategy. An essential differen-
ce between them is that in a socialist state, the
hegemony of the New Class is fuller, its con-
trol over the working class is greater. In welfa-
re state the new and the old class mutually li-
mit one other and share control over the wor-
king class, although the New Class may at ti-
mes ally itself with the working class to impro-
ve its own position against the old class (Gould-
ner, 1979, 17).
According to these strategies it can be dis-
tinguished the different paths of the New Class
to power. It can be Marxist way where intel-
lectuals provide ideology and perform the role
of leadership as Vanguard. According to Sze-
lenyi, Gouldner here identifies certain featu-
res of intellectuals “that make it possible for
Marxist intellectuals to pursue self-interested
goals while pretending to represent universa-
listic interests”. Thus, “armed with this know-
ledge, the revolutionary intelligentsia can sub-
stitute itself for the proletariat and emerge from
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the revolution as a new dominant class” (Sze-
lenyi, 1994, 726). However, according to
Gouldner, after capture of state power, the po-
sition of Vanguard itself becomes precarious:
“in Russia it was pulverized by Stalinism; in
China by the Cultural Revolution” (Gouldner,
1979, 79).
Eurocommunism is the other path of the
New Class in the democratic states. On the one
hand, it remains committed to the extension of
the state’s sway over the economy, thereby re-
moving career blockages for the New Class and,
on the other, it renounces the “dictatorship of
the proletariat” and commits itself to a plura-
listic democracy thus limits the threat of cen-
sorship (Gouldner, 1979, 82). However, the
involvement of some members of New Class
into Nazi movement reveals that the New Class
must not “necessarily move it towards the left
and towards solidarity with the old working
class” (Gouldner, 1979, 70).
Nevertheless, Gouldner states that the New
Class in current democracies is unlike to be-
have revolutionary: “its rise will more nearly
be like that of bourgeoisie than like revolutions
made in the name of the working class” (Gould-
ner, 1979, 31). This is a ‘revolution-in-perma-
nence’ that is grounded in the culture of criti-
cal discourse. However, it can be noticed the
significant shift among the New Class from the
critics towards exploitation, etc. to the new
public discourse. These new areas of the inte-
rests of the New Class in democratic countries
can be described as advocating the academic
freedom; the protection of “consumer” rights;
the development public policy and of an ‘inde-
pendent” Civil Service; and as participation in
various new movements, for example  (e.g. in-
ternational ecology movement).
Nevertheless, here it can be noticed the cru-
cial contradictions in behavior of the New
Class. That is, “if the New Class is characteri-
zed by its commitment to CCD, then how can
it also join Vanguard Party which limits and acts
inimically toward CCD?” (Gouldner, 1979,
81). The answer rests upon the contradiction
character of the New Class: it has both an ide-
ology of CCD as disposition to freedom and
interests in its cultural capital that make it an
elite concerned to monopolize incomes and pri-
vileges (ibid., 81).
After the Gouldner’s insightful analysis of
dual nature of knowledge class the discourse
on intellectuals went mainly in away of critics
of deepening tendency of this group towards
more and more conformism, elitism and cultu-
ral reproduction. As an examples of such cri-
tics can serve the arguments of R. Jacoby who
after one decade looks for the reasons of noti-
ceably deeper isolation of cultural elite and di-
sappearance of public intellectuals.
Russell Jacoby in his book  “The Last In-
tellectuals” emphases the tremendous decline
of involvement of intellectuals in public deba-
tes thus the loosing role of them in providing
in society a critical discourse. He claims that
independent public intellectuals such as “wri-
ters and thinkers who address a general and
educated audience” (Jacoby, 1989, 5) “have
been supplanted by high-tech intellectuals, con-
sultants and professors - anonymous souls, who
may be competent, and more than competent,
but who do not enrich public life” (ibid., X).
The essential argument of Jacoby is that the
public role of cultural elite and especially left
intellectuals who mostly support the democra-
tic principals is decreasing because their ener-
gy became to be expended in theoretical dis-
course and academic careerism instead of the
public activity. According to Jacoby, the ex-
pansion of universities resulted in the fact that
“younger intellectuals, whose lives have unfol-
ded almost entirely on campuses, direct them-
selves to professional colleagues but are inac-
cessible and unknown to others” (Jacoby, 1989,
X). Besides, “their jobs, advancement, and sa-
laries depend on the evaluation of specialists,
and this dependence affects the issues broa-
ched and the language employed” (ibid., 6).
This financial dependence on evaluation, va-
rious funds and limited decision making is also
in main focus of Etzioni-Halevy critics of in-
tellectuals (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993).
Thus the need, urgently expressed in the
1960s and early 1970s, to connect intellectu-
al work with everyday experience and with so-
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cial movements seems to have been replaced
by an urgent need to be recognized by fellow
intellectuals. Moreover, the sense that politi-
cally engaged intellectuals might form and su-
stain their own community has faded as, mo-
re and more, they become integrated into
their disciplines, departments, and campus ad-
ministrations. Therefore, the professionaliza-
tion of New Left intellectuals and their see-
king for such academic life benefits as the se-
curity of job and regular salaries, grants and
funded researches, long vocations and free-
dom to write as well as teach what they wont
replaces the free and vital public activity (Ja-
coby, 1989, 118). To succeed in the academic
field, according to Jacoby, “neither brilliance
nor public contribution count, since both are
viewed with suspicion - signs of a nonprofes-
sional bent - but conformity and ‘contacts’,
connections with reputable institutions or pe-
ople” (ibid., 144).
In effect, the intellectual left organized it-
self sufficiency to win some legitimacy, to gain
a position in the institutional life of society -
but the price of this victory has been to accept
the institutional logic of the academy, especially
in terms of the style of the writings and work
and the definition of their audiences and their
social functions. It results in the fact that “the
vocabulary, which political science shares with
sociology and international studies, reduces hu-
man and social conflict to diagrams and com-
puters printouts” (Jacoby, 1989, 156). Thus,
as Jacoby pessimistically points out, their “pro-
fessionalization leads to privatization or depo-
litization” (ibid., 147).
Christopher Lasch in his book “The Revolt
of the Elites” reveals other negative aspects of
alienation of nowadays intellectuals and espe-
cially cultural elite. In Lasch work it appears
that extending of well-educated people in the
end of XX century results in the triumph of
elites and in the disdain up on working and even
middle class which “failed to share the vast for-
tunes accumulated in real estate, finance, and
manufacturing” (Lasch, 1995, 31). Thus ge-
neral tendency “runs more and more in the di-
rection of a two-class society in which the fa-
vored few monopolize the advantages of mo-
ney, education, and power” (ibid., 29).
These professional and managerial elites
constitute almost 20% of population in USA
and is “a new class only in the sense that their
livelihoods rest not so much on the ownership
of property as on manipulation of information
and professional expertise (Lasch, 1995, 34).
Similarly to Bell, Lash also has doubts about
the possibility  of this group with a wide varie-
ty of occupations to carry out the political ro-
le, because the lack a common political outlo-
ok (ibid., 34).
What new Lash added is the argument that
the new elites is defined, apart from its rapidly
rising income, by a way of life that distinguis-
hes it from the rest of the population (Lasch,
1995, 33). This new way of life first of all re-
fers to the cosmopotitan character of their
work as well as their new ideology. Thus their
loyalties - if the term is not itself anachronistic
in this context - are international rather than
regional, national, or local. They have more “in
common with their counterparts in Brussels or
Hong Kong than with the masses of Americans
not yet plugged into the network of global com-
munications” (ibid.., 35). Their ties to an in-
ternational culture of work and leisure - of bu-
siness, entertainment, information, and “infor-
mation retrieval” - make many of them deeply
indifferent to the prospect of American natio-
nal decline (ibid., 45).
Here Lash uses also the arguments of Reich
that without national attachments people have
little inclination to make sacrifices or to ac-
cept responsibility for their actions. “We learn
to feel responsible for others because we share
with them a common history, …a common cul-
ture, … a common fate”. The denationaliza-
tion of business enterprise tends to produce a
class of cosmopolitans who see themselves as
“world citizens, but without accepting ... any
of obligations that citizenship in a polity nor-
mally implies” (in Lasch, 1995, 47).
Therefore here Lasch reveals also the ne-
gative aspects of cosmopolitanist feature of in-
tellectuals that in Goudner’s theory has only
the positive one. And definitely Lasch was not
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alone in this line of thinking. A lot of other
authors heavily contributed to the critics of
such cosmopolitanism, for example, Friedman
blames global culturally hybridized elite as em-
bedding the new source of real power, both po-
litical and economic, in the world system that
shows their fragmented political identities and
allegiances (Friedman, 1997, 84-85). The inc-
reasing rootlessness among intellectuals and es-
pecially the new fashion of being proud of this
also is criticized by Pels as nomadic narcissism
(Pels, 1999, 71).
Other harsh critic on intellectuals deals with
cultural reproduction of this social group. Lash
points out that the forces of reproduction of
such elites are very strong: “tests measuring
academic achievement are culturally biased, and
academic achievement has become hereditary,
in effect, since the upper middle classes pass
on to their children the accumulated advanta-
ges that virtually guarantee advancement”
(Lasch, 1995, 44). Bell also had noticed the
fact that “the college population is still drawn
principally from the middle class” (Bell, 1973,
239), however the full mechanism of cultural
reproduction of intellectuals was brilliantly re-
vealed by P. Bourdieu. He not only showed how
economic capital of middle class families is con-
verted to the education of their offspring by
also explained that all the culture of school is
biased by middle class culture (in terms of ac-
cent on language, poetry, Latin, etc.).
If to go back to Lash, in knowing such here-
ditary advantages, the new class is interested in
maintaining of the fiction that its power rests
on intelligence alone. Thus, according to Lash,
the new elites have a heavy investment in the
notion of social mobility - the only kind of equ-
ality they understand. They would like to belie-
ve that Americans have always equated oppor-
tunity with upward mobility (Lasch, 1995, 50).
Thus the new elites - mobile and increasin-
gly global in outlook - refuse to accept limits
or ties to nation and place. Lasch contends that,
as they isolate themselves in their networks and
enclaves, they abandon the middle class, divi-
de the nation, and betray the idea of a democ-
racy for all America’s citizens. The author tra-
ces how meritocracy - selective elevation into
the elite - gradually replaced the original Ame-
rican democratic ideal of competence and res-
pect for every man.
However, it can be found the more positive
approach towards the future of cultural elites,
according to which, Lash’s and Jacoby’s diag-
nosis is too pessimistic.  For example, as Flacks
points out, a sizable number of academics and
professionals have continued struggling to con-
nect their work and dedicate energy to chan-
ge-oriented projects. The activist core of lo-
cally based peace, environmental, feminist, hu-
man rights, and social justice projects includes
a high proportion of academics. Thus on of fra-
meworks of possible relevance of cultural eli-
tes to the democracy is “the framework provi-
ded by social movements” (Flacks, 1991, 13)
or broader civil society (Goldfarb, 1998).
According to Flacks, the problem of the
post-1960s generation is that it has lost the sen-
se of a shared project and vision - not that it
has produced so few “stars” or that its mem-
bers have become politically disaffiliated. A ge-
neration once possessed by a collective identi-
ty now finds itself dispersed into thousands of
fragments (Flacks, 1991, 13). However, des-
pite the diversity of social movements they
“compels a quest for new models of political
action, new relations between intellectuals and
the grass roots” (ibid., 14). Thus they create
the new common ground “in order to gain suf-
ficient social leverage to achieve needed chan-
ge and in order to create the basis for democ-
ratic mutuality” (ibid., 15).
The reflection of western discourse on
intellectuals in case of intelligentsia in
post-socialist transformation
The most powerful employment of New
Class theories can be found in Ivan Szelenyi
and George Konrad in their inspiring book
”The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Po-
wer” which offers an analysis quite similar to
that of Gouldner but focused on socialist case.
The main idea deals with the claims of intelli-
gentsia in Eastern Europe for the class power
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by “virtue of its monopoly over the ‘technolo-
gical knowledge’”. These claims, according to
these authors, was partly realized when “in post-
Stalinist epoch, the bureaucracy has indeed ope-
ned up and joined forces with the intelligentsia
as a new dominant class” (Szelenyi, 1994, 726).
However, later Szelenyi in analyzing the re-
sults of ‘velvet’ revolutions states, what he to-
gether with Konrad were right in prediction
that intellectuals are coming to power in East-
ern Europe, but he confessed that actually they
were right for the wrong reason. Therefore,
intellectuals “did not achieve power by ratio-
nalizing redistribute power”, but instead they
defeated the bureaucracy in a ‘discursive re-
volution’ of the kind Gouldner forecasted”.
But, from the other hand, it may have been ‘a
Pyrrhic victory’: “if intellectuals eliminate the
redistributive institutions along with the state
socialist bureaucracy, they undermine in the
long run the economic and social base of their
own collective power as well” (Szelenyi, 1994,
728).
Ivan Bernik also points out the self-interests
of soviet intelligentsia. But, differently from
Szelenyi and Kondrad, he reveals these inte-
rests among other wing of this intelligentsia -
among non-conformists. They saw themselves
as a ‘vanguard’ of resistance to the authorita-
rian regime and as such as a public voice of
demand to create a free space to help society
to express itself in form of different social mo-
vements, forums, and initiatives. However, such
“civil society ideology” generated by this intel-
ligentsia during socialist regime was not ‘un-
biased”, but in opposite - “strongly related to
the vital interests” of it (Bernik, 1999, 108).
These interests are primarily based in ensuring
their professional autonomy and to improve
their economic status. Thus “the attempts in
revive civil society and the corresponding en-
visaged radical limitation of the prerogatives
of the state would clearly be instrumental in
the realization of these interests” (ibid.).
The further confirmation of Gouldner’s in-
sight on the ability of New Class of highly edu-
cated people to mobilize in seeking of the poli-
tical goals can be clearly found in the role per-
formed by intelligentsia during ‘velvet” revo-
lutions. As Konrad and Szelenyj emphasized,
in the events of these years the role of intellec-
tuals in all post-soviet countries was the most
important, besides, it was exactly intellectuals
who formed a new political elite. However, ac-
cording to them, this is characteristic only of a
transformational period. Thus they will prepa-
re soil for a new class, for which the same in-
tellectuals are also candidates (Szelenyj, 1991,
338).
The processes that started soon after the
‘velvet’ (or ‘singing’ and so on) revolutions con-
firmed such prediction. Paradoxically, the in-
telligentsia, in fact being the main initiator of
the collapse of communism, faced the substan-
tial decrease their political role as well as the
importance of them as guardians of eternal and
universal values. This situation can be explai-
ned first of all by the declining need for the
intelligentsia’s function to articulate the ‘truth’
and, that is the most important, the insufficient
competence of intelligentsia to perform the role
of political leading. As Donskis points out, in-
telligentsia with it’s focus on the moral, cultu-
ral and more spiritual but not material issues
was not prepared for the new real political and
economic goals (Donskis, 1997, 102). In this
respect, according to Kennedy, intelligentsia
“will be assured of continuity leadership only
insofar as they become, on one hand, members
of new entrepreneurs class, or professional po-
liticians” (Kennedy, 1992, 63).
Such the decline of essential functions of in-
telligentsia is widely seen as the natural death of
intelligentsia or at least the retirement of it “from
the stage” (Kurczewska, 1995, 249). The main
preconditions are rooted in the fact that “the
organizational and symbolic context required for
its existence and for the charge of its self-ap-
pointed tasks has ‘come to an end’ (ibid., 248).
Despite this, the major part of intelligentsia re-
flected “that the losses outnumbered the gains”,
and the lost of prestige and in many cases of the
material resources leaded towards the new cri-
tics of ‘unfinished democratization’ in the best
case, or even towards “turning away from the
ideals of democracy” in the case of Russian in-
S o c i a l i n ë   s t r a t i f i k a c i j a
80
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2003/1, ISSN 1392-3358
telligentsia (Greenfeld, 1996, 419). Thus, in spi-
te of being the main supporters of democratic
order, in such conditions, intelligentsia can start
to perform the role of opposing of progressive
political development in defending first of all it
own interests.
According to most widespread opinion, in
coming era of new market relations the only
way for former intelligentsia to survive is to
adapt to these new requirements by silent split
into two parts: specialists and intellectuals as
men and women of ideas. Such theoretical po-
sition can be illustrated, for example, by the
view of Kennedy, that “intelligentsia will beco-
me good professionals and give up their aspi-
rations for a leading role in the making of East-
ern European society”(Kennedy, 1992, 64) or
by the prognosis of Mokrzycki, that “the new
‘knowledge class’ may emerge in its place, but
it will retain some of intelligentsia’s features
(Mokrzycki, 1994). Evidently such assumptions
echo the main idea of Bell on politically neut-
ral knowledge class.
However, in some works it can be found
the signs of idealization of Western intellec-
tuals. For example Gudkov, by opposing the
intellectuals to the “morally old-fashioned” in-
telligentsia, claims that the most distinguis-
hing feature of intellectual is innovations. They
are created by skeptical evaluation of tradi-
tions, therefore intellectuals “cultivate the re-
flection of internal moral and conceptual sys-
tems and clichés of values” as “a rational self-
control”. Such reflection is based, according
to him, on the principle of “ethics of respon-
sibility” - “personal responsibility for results
of ideas, words and actions”, while the intelli-
gentsia is highly influenced by “dogmas and
ideological postulates” (Gudkov, 1995, 151).
Such a view completely disregards the real si-
tuation of Western intellectuals that was desc-
ribed by Jacoby and Lasch by revealing the
degradation of these intellectuals in terms of
responsibility, of involvement into public de-
bates, and of representing of people’s interests.
Nevertheless, the further observation of qui-
te chaotic development of post-communist so-
cieties revealed the growing interest in a hig-
her education and useful knowledge as well as
the need to revive the critical discourse. All
this provides a basis for considerable increase
of symbolic power of intellectuals. As Kurc-
zewski notices, such situation when “the uni-
versity professor is on the top of the prestige
scale while the politician in on the bottom”,
“the specific elite role of the whole group of
the intelligentsia, not to speak of its elite of
intellectuals seems to be secured in the near
future” (Kurczewski, 1997, 226). This role of
intellectuals first of all is associated with the
fostering of democratization process through
articulation and deliberation of pressing pro-
blems as well as involvement into expansion of
civil society.
However, the elitist stance of intellectuals
can complicate the consolidation of new de-
mocracies in post-communist societies, since
it promotes the biased interests and creates a
distance from the rest social groups. Therefo-
re, in order to develop the democratic political
culture in “non-democratic societies” (Mokr-
zycki, 2000, 64), it should be made an attempt
to involve broader segments of these societies
in active participation, to share accumulated
through studies abroad knowledge, and to cri-
tizice the backwardness or new unfavorable de-
velopments of these societies.  In this perspec-
tive post-socialist intellectuals would be ‘a cen-
tral democratic actors’ (Goldfarb, 1998) in po-
litical arenas of respective societies, who would
be able to face not only difficulties of transfor-
mation process but also a new challenges of
global ‘crisis of democracy’ (Castells, 1997),
of the rise of ‘informational’ or ‘e-democracy’
as well as the ‘power games’ of globalized in-
tellectual elites (Friedman, 2000, 19).
Conclusions
In summarizing the paper, it can be said that
Western theories of New Class in Bell’s and
especially in Gouldner’s works are extremely
fruitful for the examination of changing roles
of intellectuals in post-communist societies. If
the first theory reveals the objective tenden-
cies of new most powerful position of ‘know-
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ledge class’ due to its monopolistic possession
of skills and knowledge in the era of high tech-
nologies, the theory of Gouldner defines the
dual character of this New Class as being “both
emancipatory and elitist” at the same time
(Gouldner, 1979, 82).
Such discourse on Western intellectuals re-
veals at least two main roles. From the one hand,
they clearly perform the role of accumulation,
dissemination and implementing of knowled-
ge. From the other hand, such intellectuals are
not neural but in opposite - engaged in politi-
cal activity through the rise of new ideas and
involvement into new ecological, feminist, etc.
movements. But, as Gouldner states, such New
Class elites also seeks their own interests as
holders of cultural capital, prestige and privi-
leges that results from this power and thus se-
eks to maintain the status quo.
Most of Central East European authors in-
volved in the debates about the intellectuals em-
ploy this Western discourse in different pur-
poses: to find the similarities, to criticize, or to
make some assumptions on the future role of
post-communist intellectuals. Therefore they
reveal both the activation and sudden decrea-
se of political role of post-socialist intellectu-
als. Also they point out the different strategies
of this group in post-socialist reality: one is the
silent adaptation and transformation to the
neutral group of professionals and other - the
strong opposition to the democratizing proces-
ses.  But due to some idealization of Western
intellectuals most of them hardly enter the hot
debates of last decade about the conformist
character of knowledge class, about deepening
of its alienation from the rest of society and
about nomadism of cosmopolitan intellectuals
as it was briefly showed by Jacoby and Lasch.
Besides, in talking about the decreasing of
role of intellectuals in post-communist socie-
ties, almost all authors disregards the poten-
tial self-realization of this group by involving
into the active creation of civil society sector.
It is exactly this sector where such intellectu-
als can use all of its potential of culture of cri-
tical discourse. Moreover, by claims of neces-
sity of development of this sphere for ‘making
democracy work’ they may legitimize their ‘in-
dispensable’ usefulness and in this way to de-
fend their interests to remain as one of main
political actors. Thus it can be fully agreed with
the Eyerman’s thought that new generations of
intellectuals have to and definitely will const-
ruct their new roles in new contexts (Eyerman,
1994, 16).
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